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DOUBLE FRACTION PROBLEMS IN INSTRUMENTS
INVOLVING MINERAL INTERESTS
by
Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr.*
T is clear that a conveyance of a designated tract of land purports
to convey the entire fee simple estate therein to the grantee. It is also
clear that if in such a conveyance there is a reservation of a fractional interest, said reservation purports to be of the entire fee simple
estate, regardless of whether the grantor owns only a fractional part
of that estate.
For example, A owns an undivided V4 interest in Lot 1. A executes
a deed in favor of B reading "A hereby conveys to B Lot 1, except
that A reserves to himself a 4 mineral interest therein." Here, clearly
A has attempted to reserve a full /4 mineral interest to himself, not
!/ of A's V4. To what extent A succeeds in this attempt will be discussed later herein.
Double fraction problems arise where a fraction, or its equivalent,
is inserted in the granting clause, including the property description,
and then there is a later exception of a fractional interest in the land
or property covered by the deed. Query: In such a case is the reference to the land a reference to the physical land described, or to the
fractional interest included in the property description?
The problem is not a new one. In Callahan v. Martin,' the California Supreme Court had this to say about it:
"... the word 'property' is commonly used in two different senses:
First, it is applied to those external things which are the objects of
rights or estates, to those things which, in the language of Blackstone,
are objects of dominion or property ....It is also applied to the rights
or estates which a man may acquire in and to things ....Thus land, as
the object of rights, is described as a thing real, or as real property.
The rights or estate which the owner in fee or for life has in land are
also described as real property ......
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788, 792, 101 A.L.R. 871 (1935).
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There are several possible ways of putting a fraction in the property description, which is a part of the granting clause. One is to
specifically designate a fraction; another is to recite "all of grantor's
interest" where said interest is in fact a fractional one; still another
is to refer in the property description to a prior deed which conveyed only a fractional interest. Examples follow, in each of which
the physical land in question will be referred to as Lot 1.
In Hooks v. Neill," A, owning an undivided one-half interest in
Lot 1, executed a deed in favor of B. The granting clause conveyed to
B all of A's right, title and interest -in Lot 1. A later provision in the
deed reserved to A a "1/32 part of all oil on and under the said land
and premises herein described and conveyed." Query: Was this a
reservation of 1/32 of grantor's interest, which would be 1/32 of
'/2, or was it of 1/32 of the entire title to Lot 1? The court answered
this question by holding that the reference back was to the interest
set forth in the granting clause and that therefore the reservation was
of 1/32 of /2.
Exactly the same fraction problem would have been presented if
instead of reciting "all of A's right, title and interest in Lot 1," the
recital had been "an undivided one-half interest in Lot 1." In either
instance, the pivotal question would be whether the reference back
was to the physical land or was to the grantor's interest therein.
In King v. National Bank,3 A executed a deed in favor of B. The
granting clause referred to the interest conveyed as an undivided
one-half interest in Lot 1. By a later provision A reserved oneeighth of royalties from oil, gas or other minerals produced from the
above described land. Query: What is the above described land? Is it
the physical land, or, to put it another way, the entire title to the
physical land? Or is the above described land the fraction of one-half
referred to in describing the physical land? The Court held that the
reference back was to the physical land and that therefore the reservation was of /8 of total royalty, and not IY of 2 of total royalty.
The Court distinguished Hooks v. Neill on the ground that there the
reference was to the land conveyed, whereas here the reference was
to the land described. It is submitted that at best this distinction is a
tenuous one. It is further submitted that the King case, in holding
that the reference back is to the physical land (which is another way
221 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Of collateral interest, the reservation here was

of oil, not of oil, gas and other minerals.
a 144 Tex. $83, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946). For an interesting discussion of many of the
cases which will be discussed herein, see Niblack, CREPTOrHESIA, 20 TEx. BAR J. 115
(1957).
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of saying to the entire title to the physical land), probably gave effect
to the actual intention of the parties whereas the holding in Hooks v.
Neill probably did not.
In Pollock v. McAllister," A owning an undivided one-half mineral interest in Lot 1 executed an oil and gas lease in favor of B.
The granting clause therein recited "an undivided one-half mineral interest" in Lot 1. In addition to the usual royalties, the lease
reserved to A "1/16 of V8 of the total oil, gas and other minerals
produced, saved and marketed under the terms of this lease. Query:
Was this a reservation of 1/16 of Y8 of the /2 referred to in
granting clause, as distinguished from 1/16 of Y8 of gross production? The Court held that the reference back was to the fraction
set forth in the granting clause, and that therefore the reservation
was of 1/16 of 8 of V. An alternative ground for the decision
was that the proportionate reduction clause in the lease' operated
to reduce the royalty, assuming the reference to be to the physical land.
Suppose an oil and gas lease on a usual form does not refer to a
fraction when in fact all that the lessor owns is a fractional interest.
This presents two questions. One is whether the proportionate reduction clause has the effect by implication of placing the fraction
owned by the lessor in the granting clause. The second is whether, if
it does, the proportionate reduction clause refers to the fraction as
distinguished from the physical land. The second question is not
reached unless the first is answered in the affirmative.
In McMahon v. Christman,' A owning a 1/6 mineral interest executed a full interest oil and gas lease. In addition to the usual royalty,
the lease provided: "The lessors herein reserve unto themselves, their
heirs and assigns, without reduction, as an overriding royalty, a net
1/32 of 8/8 of all oil or gas produced and saved from the above described premises." The court held that the effect of the proportionate
reduction clause was to make the granting clause the same as if it had
granted a 1/6 interest in the physical land, basing this holding,, at
least in part, upon an admission in oral argument that the proportionate reduction clause operated to avoid breach of warranty. It is submitted that both holdings are in error. If there was any justification
for cutting down the additional royalty, it was that the proportionate
reduction clause operated to do so. Against such justification, arguably
4215 Ark. 842, 223 S.W.2d 813 (1949).

'This is the provision that where the lessor owns less than the entire fee simple estate,
rentals and royalty shall be proportionately reduced.
'285

S.W.2d 818, 5 OI,.

AND

GAs REP. 1254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error granted.
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the additional provision being typewritten and being more specific,
should control. Overriding these questions is that of whether A would
be estopped to claim a royalty larger in proportion than his mineral
interest.
In Clemmons v. Kennedy,' A owning a 2 mineral interest executed
a full interest oil and gas lease. A later conveyed a 2 mineral interest
to B. The deed recited that it was subject to the lease but included
2 of royalty payable thereunder. By reason of the proportionate
reduction clause, only 1/2 of the V8 was payable thereunder. The
court, however, held that the deed conveyed '2 of the royalty purportedly payable under the lease and that therefore B acquired the
entire interest of A. This result is believed to be the correct one.
A similar result was reached in R. Lacy Inc. v. Jarrett, wherein A
owning a 7/12 interest executed an oil and gas lease on a usual form
providing for a $15,000 oil payment payable out of !/8 of 7/8 "of
the oil if, as and only when produced, saved and marketed from said
land under this lease." The court construed this reservation to be
8 of 7/8 gross. Query: Why did not the proportionate reduction
clause operate to reduce the interest reserved? The answer is that a
production payment is a form of bonus and hence is not covered by
the usual proportionate reduction clause, which is limited to royalty
and rental. This points to the importance of adding a proportionate
reduction clause to a production payment, if the parties intend such
reduction.
In Texas Co. v. Parks,' A executed an oil and gas lease in which
the granting clause referred to the property as being an undivided 2
interest in Lot 1. The lease provided for an annual delay rental of
$160. The lessee construed the proportionate reduction clause as reducing the amount of the rental to $80, and deposited that amount to
the lessor's credit in the depositor's bank named in the lease. The court
held the proportionate reduction clause referable to the fraction set
forth with the description of the physical land and that therefore the
payment should have been $160. The result was that the lease terminated by its own terms. The court in reaching this result attempted
to disinguish the King case supra, but it is thought that in principle
the cases are in conflict. It is submitted that the King case probably
gave effect to the intention of the parties whereas the Parks case
probably did not.
If, as held in the Parks case, putting a fraction in the granting clause
768 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.
8 214 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref.
9247 S.W.2d 179, 1 OIL AND GAS REP. 555, 2007 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
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of the lease renders the proportionate clause inapplicable to the extent
of said fraction, what is the effect of this holding as to royalty pay-

ments? The delay rental is a designated money amount. The royalty
is measured by a fraction of production, usually one-eighth of oil and
gas production from the land. If land is the designated fractional
mineral interest for the purpose of computing rentals it follows that
it is the designated fraction for the purpose of computing royalty
payments. Therefore, under the Parks case, royalty would be 8 of
2 even though the proportionate reduction clause is not applicable.
The reason for this is that the usual royalty is designated as a fraction
of production. As to a shut-in royalty or a minimum royalty designating an amount of money payable, the Parks case would seem
applicable and thereunder the amount of such payment would not
be reduced.
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison,1" A owning a 34
mineral interest in Lot 1 executed an oil and gas lease which was expressly limited to the undivided 34 interest. A later conveyed a onehalf mineral interest to B. The deed recited that it was subject to the
outstanding lease but included 2 of royalty payable thereunder and
2 of delay rentals "which may be paid on the above-described
land." The lessee paid /2 of the designated rental to B. The Court
held that this was incorrect because the reference to 2 meant 2
of total delay rentals. In support of this result, the Court stressed the
language "which may be paid on the above-described land." The
Court did not reach the problem of how royalty should be paid.
Incidentally, the deed in question was sufficiently ambiguous that
under all of the facts of the case the grantee was estopped to assert
termination of the lease because of the erroneous payment.
A possible way, in addition to those heretofore considered, of
having a double fraction problem is by referring in the granting
clause to a prior deed which in turn conveyed only a fractional interest.
Three possible circumstances are presented where in the property
description in a deed or other instrument a prior deed, which conveyed only a fractional interest, is referred to and then later a fractional interest is reserved "in the above-described land" or "in the land
hereby conveyed" or "in the premises herein described." One is that
the reserved interest is of the fraction conveyed in the deed referred
to. Another is that the effect of the reference is to deduct from the
to and also the fractional interest later reserved. The third possibility is
0 146 Tex. 216, 265 S.W.2d 355 (1947)..
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interest of the grantee both the fractional interest in the deed referred
that the reference back is to describe, or further describe, the physical
land being conveyed.

In Winters v. Slover,"1 A conveyed Lot 1 to B, reserving one-half
of the minerals. B executed a deed of trust securing a debt payable
to E, which specifically described Lot 1 and then referred to it as the
same property conveyed by A to B. The Court, as an alternative
ground for its decision in the case, held that the reference back cut
down the interest covered by the deed of trust to that which was conveyed by A and B, and hence that the deed of trust did not purport
to cover 2 mineral interest excepted from the earlier deed. Looking

for the intention of the parties, it seems probable that the reference
back was to identify the physical land and not to cut down the
interest covered by the deed of trust.
In the later case of Sharp v. Fowler," A deeded Lot 1 to B, reserving
all the minerals. A later deeded the minerals in Lot 1 to B. B later
conveyed 34 of the minerals to X. B later conveyed to C by a deed,
the sole property description in which was that the land was the same
land conveyed in the first deed from A to B-which deed conveyed
only the surface estate. Query: Was the reference back to define the
estate granted, or was it to identify the physical land described in the
deed? The Court held that it was to describe the physical land and
that therefore the deed conveyed both the surface estate and also B's
/ mineral interest. The Court said:
"To describe land is to outline its boundaries so that it may be located
on the ground, and not to define the estate conveyed therein."
It is submitted that Sharp v. Fowler is correct and also that it
cannot be reconciled in principle with Winters v. Slover, or, for that
matter, although to a lesser extent, with Hooks v. Neill or Parks

v. Texas Co.
In Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.," A owned the surface and
/2 of the minerals in a tract of land. A executed a deed to B which
described the physical land and then recited that it was the same
land formerly owned by X. (X had owned only the surface and the
same 2 mineral interest which A owned.) Later in the deed from
A to B, A reserved 2 mineral interest "in the land."
A contended that by referring back to X's title, the granting clause
only conveyed the surface and /2 of the minerals and that the sub-

" 151

Tex. 485, 251 S.W.2d 726, 1 OIL AND GAS REP. 1873 (1952).
12151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d 153, 1 OIL AND GAS REP. 1835 (1952).
'8135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
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sequent reservation of 2 of the minerals was a reservation of V2
of 2 of the minerals. The Court did not reach the second contention-that is, that the reference back was to the fractional interest

thertofore owned by X-because the Court held that the only effect
of the reference was to further define the physical land covered by the
deed. Based upon this holding, the Court held that the effect of the
reservation was that the deed purported to convey to B the entire
title minus the 2 mineral interest reserved to A, which equalled
the surface estate plus 2 of the minerals; that as A owned only a
2 mineral interest, his attempt to reserve the interest failed, the
interest passing under an analogy to the doctrine of after-acquired

title. The Court mentioned but did not base its decision on the earlier
case of Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.14 In that case a reservation
was held to evidence an intent to carve out of the grant the interest
theretofore conveyed and not to reserve any interest in the grantor.
The Duhig case seems correct in holding that A attempted to and
intended to reserve an interest to himself and was not referring to the
outstanding interest. Query: Looking at the instrument from its four'
corners, did the reference to prior ownership, plus the reserved interest, establish an intention to deduct from the interest granted both
the outstanding interest and also an additional 2 mineral interest
in the grantor? Let us consider this possibility in analyzing the next
two cases.
In Remuda Oil Co. v. Windsor,"' A conveyed to B, reserving "2
of 8 royalty, being 1/16 of all oil, gas and other minerals." A
later conveyed to C
of royalty in a tract which was specifically
described. The description was followed by this clause: "being the
same land described [in the deed from A to B] reference to which
deed is here made for all purposes." B later executed an oil and gas
lease which provided for a I/ royalty. The total royalty attributable
to the interests of A and C was 1/16 of gross. This was because A's
reservation was of a 1/16 royalty. The royalty can vary with the
fraction reserved in the lease only when the royalty interest is "of

royalty." For example, the owner of 2 royalty, under a lease providing for a A royalty, would be entitled to 2 of V4, being
8 of gross. The owner of a 1/16 royalty interest could never have
a right to more than a free 1/16 of gross.
Under the lease in question, A contended that his conveyance to
C was of 1/2 of his 1/16, while C contended it was
of royalty,
14 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935).

5 264 S.W.2d 192, 3 OL AND GAS

Pn'. 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
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which would entitle C to !/ of the

V4 royalty, being 1/16 of
gross production, leaving A nothing. The court held that the effect
of referring back to the prior deed from A to B, when construed

with the rest of the provisions of the deed, evidenced an intent upon
the part of A and C that C should receive 2 of A's 1/16 royalty
interest.
In Harris v. Windsor," L conveyed to T reserving to L an undivided 2 mineral interest. T's interest became vested in a bank. The
bank conveyed to W by a deed in which the general warranty provision was qualified by a provsion that the deed was subject to all
restrictions and reservations in the deed from L to T, reference to
which deed was made for all legal purposes. W conveyed to H. This
deed described the physical land, and then recited, ...and being the
same land described in Warranty deed from [the bank to W, followed
by recording data] reference to which is made for all purposes..."
Following this reference was a reservation to W of 8 "interest in
and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under that may
be produced from the above described premises..." The Court held
that the effect of referring to the prior deed for all purposes was to
deduct from the estate granted to H both the interest reserved out
of the prior deed, and also the 8 mineral interest reserved by H.
While it is possible to distinguish the last two cases from the earlier
cases discussed herein, including the Duhig case, the last two cases
seem to represent a liberalization by the courts of the four-corner
rule to give effect to a reserved interest even though the reserving
party has overconveyed-unless saved from doing so by the reference back to the prior deed. Also, both of the last two cases, at
least by inference, support the proposition that the reference back
is not to cut down or otherwise modify a subsequent reservation
in the same deed of a fractional interest "in the above described
land."
One might with some reason wonder whether, under recent cases,
even without a reference back to a prior deed, a reservation to the
grantor which cuts down the estate granted should be given effect
upon the theory that the grantee is charged as a matter of law with
knowledge of the contents of all instruments in his chain of title,
and that it follows that the intention of both parties is probably
enforced more often by giving effect to the reservation than by holding that the interest passes by a doctrine analogous to that of afteracquired title.
'a 294 S.W.2d 798, 6 OIL AND GAS REP. 1234 (1956).
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CONCLUSIONS

1. This article deals primarily with two problems. The first is
where two fractions are inserted, either directly or indirectly, in
the same instrument, or in related instruments, and the question
is whether a reference to land, or some similar word is to the fraction or to the entire title in the physical land described.1"
2. In the present state of the authorities, if a fraction is possibly
included in the granting clause, either in the words of grant or in
the property description, and there is a later reservation of an interest "in the above land," or some similar phrase, there is a serious
question whether the refernce will be held to be to the fraction or
to the entire title in the physical land. A fraction is included in
the granting clause where a specific fraction is included therein,
or where grantor, owning only a fractional interest, grants "all of
grantor's right, title and interest." A fraction is possibly included in
the granting clause where the property description refers to a prior
deed which conveyed only a fractional interest.
In addition to this fraction problem another question is whether
in a situation where there is a prior outstanding interest, which
causes the fraction reserved to amount to an overconveyance, the
reserved interest passes under the doctrine of the Duhig case."8
To avoid these problems, it is suggested that the fraction be
computed upon the basis of gross production and that the reservation be so worded as to make this clear. It should also be made
clear, when intended, that the reserved interest is in addition to
any outstanding interest. For example:
There is hereby reserved and excepted unto grantor, and not conveyed hereby, an undivided one-half of eight-eighths of all of the oil,
gas and other minerals in and under the physical land above described.
There is also excepted and reserved herefrom, and not conveyed hereby,
any and all interest in the minerals, and other interests in said physical
land, record title to which is outstanding in anyone other than the
grantor herein.
The suggested provision assumes that the parties intend to except
only outstanding interests of record. If the agreement is to except
' Cases beyond the scope hereof include those in which by using two fractions, several
different sets of interest are created, one when there is no lease, and another when there is a
lease. See, for example, Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1925); Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 477, 259 S.W.2d 166, 2 OIL AND GAS REP. 1350
(1953); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617, 4 OIL AND GAS REP. 193 (1954).
" For a discussion of the difference between a reservation and an exception and the importance of this difference in determining when the Duhig case doctrine is applicable, see
discussion note to Gibson v. Turner, -Tex.-,
294 S.W.2d 781 (1956), in 6 OIL AND
GAs REP. 1212.
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all outstanding interests, the word "record" should be deleted. Such
deletion might cause the deed to be construed as a quit claim. Also,
the suggested provision would not protect an outstanding record
interest in grantor. If such is not the intent of the parties, the provision could easily be changed by so stating therein.
3. Where in an oil and gas lease, a fraction, or its equivalent or
possible equivalent, is placed in the granting clause, either in the
words of grant or in the property description, the only safe position
for a lessee to take is to assume that the proportionate reduction
clause does not cut down the amount of the delay rdntals provided
for in the lease. If the lessee desires to make the proportionate reduction clause clearly applicable, it must be rewritten to provide
in substance: "If the lessor owns less than the entire fee simple
estate in 8/8 of the physical land described herein [etc.]."
4. If a royalty or production payment, in addition to that provided for in the printed lease form, is reserved, the provision reserving it should expressly cover the question of whether the proportionate reduction clause is applicable, or should include its own
proportionate reduction clause.
5. If an interest is sold subject to an outstanding lease which
purports to cover, or possibly purports to cover, only a fractional
interest, and the grantee's rights under such lease are defined, care
should be taken to avoid a situation like that in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, supra. For example, suppose the outstanding lease is expressly limited to a one-half interest. A deed of a 2
mineral interest executed thereafter recites that it is subject to said
lease but covers and includes --------- of royalty payable thereunder.
This blank should be filled in by the word "all." If there is a question about what the outstanding lease does or says, the deed could
provide:
This deed is subject to any and all valid, recorded oil and gas leases,
but covers and includes, and grants to the grantee herein, exactly the
same right to delay rentals, royalties, and any other unaccrued interests
owned by or payable to grantor herein under the terms of any such
lease or leases as the grantee would have had, had he, owning the interest hereby conveyed, been a party lessor in any such lease or leases.

